Accountability Matters PMA

CLARIFICATION:

Accountability Matters is not affiliated with Leah A. Ficklin, this post, the “Truth Gang,” or any related page or account. We do not know Ms. Ficklin and had never heard of her until a concerned reader brought this post to our attention.

No person or page has permission to use Accountability Matters’ name, branding, or identity in a way that suggests our endorsement, involvement, or association.

Please rely only on communications published directly by Accountability Matters through our official channels.

TEXAS DRONE WATCH

Were you—or someone you know—recorded by a privately operated drone over private property without consent?

We are collecting information about private individuals and organizations using drones to photograph, video, or surveil privately owned property in Texas without the owner’s or tenant’s consent.

We want to hear from both people directly affected or people who have evidence that this has happened to others.

Useful information includes:

* Drone footage or photographs of private property
* News reports or broadcasts showing the footage
* Social-media posts, websites, or videos identifying who captured it
* Screenshots, archived posts, or public statements
* Police reports, court records, discovery, or other documents
* Information identifying drone operators, investigators, organizations, dates, or locations
* Firsthand accounts from property owners, tenants, witnesses, or people involved in the operation

Email: [email protected]

If possible, include:
- Texas county
- approximate date
- property or general location
- who you believe operated the drone
- where you saw the footage
- and any original files, screenshots, links, or documents you have.

*Please preserve original files and metadata. Do not edit or alter original footage. And do not trespass, impersonate anyone, or violate any law to obtain evidence.*

We are gathering and evaluating reports concerning private drone surveillance in Texas. Submission of information does not establish an attorney-client or any other kind of agency relationship.

KEN PAXTON’S OFFICE TO TEXANS: YOU COULD HAVE A CONSTITUTION. JUST DON’T TRY TO ENFORCE IT AGAINST THE TEXAS HOUSE.

That was the practical position the Texas Attorney General’s Office put before a Texas court in our lawsuit against the Texas House.

We sued the Texas House of Representatives, Speaker Dustin Burrows, Chief Clerk Stephen Brown, Rep. Cecil Bell Jr., and Rep. Cole Hefner seeking judicial enforcement of provisions of the Texas Constitution governing quorum, legislative journals, and representative government.

We asked a court to determine whether state officials complied with the Constitution and to order prospective relief where they did not.

Paxton’s office responded with four words:

“Sovereign immunity bars this lawsuit.”

Not buried in fifty pages of argument. That was the entire sovereign-immunity section.

And Paxton’s office filed it twice—once for the Texas House itself and again for Burrows, Brown, Bell, and Hefner in their official capacities. In both filings, the State then asked the court to dismiss all of our claims.

Think carefully about what that means.

Texans alleged that their own elected legislative officials violated the Texas Constitution. Texans went to a Texas court asking for enforcement of that Constitution. And the Attorney General’s response was: sovereign immunity, dismiss the case.

There is a serious problem with treating the monarchial doctrine of “sovereign immunity” as a constitutional force field.

The Texas Supreme Court had expressly held that this alleged “sovereign immunity” “does not preclude prospective injunctive remedies in official-capacity suits against government actors who violate statutory or constitutional provisions.” City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009).
The Court explained that ultra vires suits did not attempt to control the State; they sought to “reassert the control of the state” by requiring officials to obey existing law.

And in Phillips v. McNeill, the Texas Supreme Court described the principle behind those limits on immunity in even more fundamental terms: government was subordinate to law, and those exercising governmental power had to respect its limits.

That should have mattered because the Texas Constitution did not say political power was inherent in the House, the Speaker, or the Attorney General.

It said:

“All political power is inherent in the people.”

Tex. Const. art. I, § 2.

And Article III did not politely suggest that the House maintain a quorum and keep a journal. It commanded that two-thirds constitute a quorum and that each House “shall keep a journal of its proceedings.”

So here was the question Texans should have been asking:

If the Texas Constitution binds the Legislature, who enforces it when the Legislature itself is accused of violating it?

Because “sovereign immunity bars this lawsuit” could not be permitted to quietly become:

“The Constitution binds everyone—except the government officials you are trying to make obey it.”

That was exactly why we forced this issue into court.

Cause No. D-1-GN-25-002906
Collier, Clark, & Harguess v. Texas House of Representatives, et al.
455th Judicial District Court, Travis County, Texas

Just sharing a little telecommunications trivia. 😇📱💸

🚨 REPUBLICAN VOTERS: OPEN ZOOM TOWN HALL TODAY 🚨

Chairman (and purported candidate) Abraham George and (purported) Vice Chair candidate Amanda Hopper (wife of House Rep. Andy Hopper) will be hosting an open Zoom Town Hall today, June 6, at 5:00 PM.

If you care about election integrity, party governance, transparency, or the ongoing Rule 41 eligibility dispute, this is your opportunity to ask questions directly and hear the answers firsthand.

RSVP: https://forms.gle/uzcZSx54KB5GsQkk6

One question we hope will be addressed publicly:

Will you, or will you not, provide an official and public clarification of the date calculation used for determining compliance with Rule 41’s requirement that candidates file “at least ten (10) days prior” to the first General Session of the State Convention?

Regardless of anyone’s position on the issue, delegates, and all Texas Republicans, deserve transparency, a clear explanation, and a publicly stated interpretation of the rule.

Register. Attend. Ask questions. Stay informed.

Abraham George Invites You to a Zoom Town Hall Event Address: Zoom link provided at RSVP

**When a Counting Rule Rewrites an Eligibility Requirement**

One of the most fundamental principles of textual interpretation is that procedural rules exist to implement substantive requirements—not to alter them.

That principle matters because sometimes a general counting provision can be applied in a way that changes the meaning of the very rule it is supposed to administer.

The Republican Party of Texas Rules provide:

“To be eligible, candidates for the office of State Chairman or Vice Chairman shall be required to file a statement of intent to run with the SREC Secretary at least ten (10) days prior to the first General Session of the State Convention.”

Notice the operative language:

“To be eligible”

and

“at least ten (10) days prior.”

This is not merely a scheduling provision.

It is an eligibility requirement.

The rule does not say:

“File on the tenth calendar day.”

The rule does not say:

“File no later than June 1.”

The rule says:

“at least ten days prior.”

The ordinary meaning of “at least” establishes a minimum threshold.

The ordinary meaning of “ten days” is ten days.

If the first General Session begins on June 11, then ten days prior is June 1 at 12:00 a.m.

A filing submitted at June 1, 9:43 p.m. is not ten days prior.

It is approximately 218 hours prior.

Ten days equals 240 hours.

218 hours does not equal 240 hours.

Therefore, the filing is not “at least ten days prior.”

The analysis could end there.

The Role of Rule 1(g)

Some point to Rule 1(g), which provides:

“When computing any period of days referred to in these Rules, the first (1st) day is excluded and the last day is included.”

But that raises a deeper question:

What is Rule 1(g) computing?

If Rule 41 establishes an eligibility requirement of ten days, then Rule 1(g) cannot be interpreted in a manner that reduces the requirement itself.

A counting rule may determine how a period is measured.

A counting rule may not reduce ten days to less than ten days.

Otherwise the counting rule ceases to be procedural and becomes substantive.

And once a procedural rule changes the substantive requirement, the substantive rule has effectively been rewritten.

The Consequence of the Contrary Interpretation

Under the contrary interpretation, a filing made late in the evening on June 1 is deemed timely because June 1 is counted as the “tenth day.”

But that filing is not ten days prior.

It is not even nine and one-half days prior.

The phrase:

“at least ten days prior”

has been transformed into:

“sometime during the tenth calendar day.”

Those are not the same requirement.

One is a minimum elapsed-time requirement.

The other is a calendar-counting convention.

The text adopted by the Party chose the former.

It did not choose the latter.

Text Must Control

Textual interpretation begins with the words adopted.

The words adopted were:

“at least ten (10) days prior.”

The rule did not say:

“on or before the tenth day.”

The rule did not say:

“ten calendar days counting under Rule 1(g).”

The rule said:

“at least ten days prior.”

When the application of a general counting rule produces a result that is objectively less than ten actual days before the event, the counting rule is no longer administering the eligibility requirement.

It is altering it.

And textual interpretation does not permit a procedural rule to rewrite a substantive one.