Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center

Interagency Natural Resource Center Overcharged Diesel Truck Battery RLS – March 17, 2026

A 2012 Dodge Ram 2500 with reoccurring battery issues, was left to charge inside a closed vehicle bay overnight. The following day, the Dispatch Center and CIO radio employees reported a strong “rotten egg” odor. This smell was so strong that the Dispatch Center Manager had employees leave the building and the CIO employees self-evacuated. Dispatch immediately began implementing their Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP).

The natural gas company and the HVAC (Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning) contractor were contacted to assess any potential hazards. The natural gas company personnel on site were able to quickly determine that the source of the odor was hydrogen sulfide from the charging diesel truck battery in the engine bay.

Lessons
1. Don’t hesitate to call the 911 line to help with unidentified smells or uncertain levels of gases. While the natural gas company generally knew what the source was, they could not measure hydrogen sulfide levels with their “sniffer.” It is unknown how much exposure the few remaining dispatchers had after the natural gas company cleared the building.
2. Battery charging should only occur when able to be monitored with the vehicle outside.
3. Having a Continuity of Operation Plan for Dispatch allowed for continued radio coverage even though their normal facilities had been evacuated.
4. Conduct an annual review of the Interagency Natural Resource Center Emergency Procedures with management and key personnel. Repeat this review whenever there are changes in key roles. Additionally, individuals in these key roles should maintain an accessible copy of the procedures for immediate reference during an emergency.

Get the full report from our homepage, link in profile.

Tulelake National Wildlife Refuge Prescribed Fire ATV Burnover RLS

On May 4, 2026, personnel from the Tulelake National Wildlife Refuge implemented a 198-acre prescribed burn in a local agricultural area. During firing operations, the lead interior lighter encountered an unexpected obstacle while advancing south through dense tules adjacent to the cold black. The ATV was halted by a crescent-shaped berm, approximately four feet high and 60 feet long, composed of compacted tule resulting from wetland water drainage activities. The berm's height, curvature, and surrounding vegetation posed a significant hazard—preventing safe navigation over it.

While attempting to reposition the ATV, the operator immediately backed up approximately 15 feet into his recently lit strip fire to quickly navigate around the berm to the safety zone. While fire intensity near the ATV was low at the time, the operator understood that there was typically a 10-second lag between lighting the strip fire and flames reaching up to 20 feet tall in the densest tules. Recognizing imminent danger, the operator promptly exited the ATV and moved to the designated safety zone in the clean black, located roughly 15 feet east of the vehicle. While the operator remained unharmed, the ATV was destroyed.

Lessons
1. Unexpected berms or compacted fuel features can develop within wetland units because of water management activities, even in areas where staff have not previously encountered them.
2. Proximity to the black does not guarantee a reliable escape route or safety zone in light flashy fuels.
3. Tall, continuous vegetation can obscure hazards and limit situational awareness during mobile ignition.
4. Reinforce the practice of continually reassessing escape routes during mobile ignition and avoiding assumptions about safety based on proximity to the black in light flashy fuels.

Get the full report from our home page, link in profile.

Washington and Jefferson NFs Fuel Geyser RLS – April 3, 2026

“I knew better,” remarked the experienced Faller 2 (FAL2) as he reflected on his recent chainsaw fuel geyser incident. In his 12 years as a certified sawyer, he’s engaged in numerous safety briefings about the dangers of fuel geysers.

After felling a 16-inch diameter-at-breast-height (DBH) burning snag and bumping up the line, the sawyer was unable to restart his saw. He moved about 20 feet away from the fire to investigate the issue. Unsure of how long it had been since he last refueled, he popped the cap off the saw, notably failing to first check the fuel window. Fuel immediately sprayed out of the saw, splashing his chaps, leg, chest and arm. He informed the Incident Commander that he was hiking down to his vehicle to clean himself off from a fuel geyser incident. Down at the truck, he changed his Nomex shirt, washed his skin, and did his best to clean the fuel off his Nomex pants. After allowing his pants to dry, he returned to the fireline and resumed work.

Lessons
1. Fatigue, both mental and physical, is a mighty foe: Not only had the sawyer worked eight days straight, but he had also been up at night with two young children at home. And while he understood the steps necessary to avoid fuel geysering, even the most ingrained process becomes more difficult when very tired.

2. The rules for trouble shooting a malfunctioning saw are situational: While we aim to build processes and order of operations into muscle memory, best practices for trouble shooting chainsaw malfunction are highly dependent on the situation and environment.

3. Little things can get you, especially during busy assignments: Beyond actively battling the fire, there are always a myriad of things to consider on the fireline. The primary focus is, of course, still on firefighting. But as tasks pile up, it’s easy to let one small thing go.

Get the full report from our homepage, link in profile.

New issue of Two More Chains!
Rapid Lesson Sharing

In this issue, we dive into Rapid Lesson Sharing: Where did it come from, how do you create one, what makes a good RLS, and how do you apply the lessons?
Plus, Travis Dotson, our longtime analyst, reflects on his time at the Lessons Learned Center.

Read it here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/two-more-chains

On May 13 at 1330 hours, a crew of firefighters completed Wildland Fire Chainsaw RT 212 Operations. They were traveling back to staging when a loud pop was heard from the bed of their pickup truck.
A can of premixed fuel had "popped" off its plastic spout and leaked fuel. Because this can was in a fuel bag, the spray was contained. Even so, leaked fuel was now in the truck bed.
Ambient air temperature was approximately 87 degrees. The truck had been sitting in the sun for approximately four hours. V***r pressure in the can caused the spout to fail. Other nearby cans in the truck’s bed were slightly expanded—but not leaking.

Lessons:
-Use caution if using premix fuel cans—they do not have venting capabilities.
-If taking to the fireline, consider transferring fuel out of these containers into a venting container.
-Be mindful to where fuels are being stored. To reduce solar radiation impacts, move to shade if possible.

Get the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/texas-training-pre-mixed-fuel-can-failure-2026

Remember - fuel in the bed of a truck can be problematic on the fireline. Earlier this year three trucks were destroyed on the Cottonwood Fire in Nebraska: "It is suspected that an ember likely landed in the back of one of the pickup trucks starting a fire which rapidly grew due to the hot and dry conditions."

Last week, LLC staff had the great privilege of attending the South Canyon Staff Ride, hosted by the Rocky Mountain Geographic Area. Joining firefighters from federal and local agencies, as well as many others whose work touches fire management, we walked the line first constructed by firefighters back in July 1994. We were guided in discussion and reflection by survivors of July 6, 1994, who told their stories and asked poignant questions. It was a humbling and powerful experience. We aspire to carry the lessons forward to share with our entire wildland fire community.

On March 19, 2026, a snag struck a sawyer during attempted mitigation efforts as part of prescribed fire operations on the Blue Buck Unit on the Mark Twain National Forest.
Due to a gap in FAL1’s memory, this account of the tree strike incident reflects FAL3’s perspective who was the only witness to the incident.
I recall the tree beginning to fall towards me, with FAL1 moving in the same direction with saw, axe, and wedge in hand. I yelled, “Watch out,” but he did not turn or look back.
The top of the snag struck the ground within several feet of where I was standing, striking FAL1 on his left side, causing him to collapse to the ground. I heard the loud impact and watched the event unfold.
I remember thinking, “This can’t be happening right now,” as I moved quickly toward him. He was lying on the ground approximately 10 feet away. I immediately contacted Saw Team 1 via the radio and notified them of the incident. The FAL1 on Saw Team 1 was a trained Emergency Medical Technician.
I knelt next to FAL1, who was lying unconscious just to the side of the tree. I was touching his arm, but he wasn’t moving. I could hear a wheezing sound and observed that his eyes were open and bloodshot. I repeatedly said, “Stay with me. Can you hear me?” while awaiting assistance from the other two personnel from Saw Team 1 who were moving in our direction.

Lesson from the report:
Techniques commonly applied in softwood-dominated environments do not always translate effectively to hardwood systems, in which cutting strategies, hinge management, and tree response can differ significantly.

The report has a detailed stump analysis and cutting sequence description.

Get the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/blue-buck-prescribed-fire-tree-strike-incident-2026

Montana Radio Cloning Issues – Montana – April 20, 2026

The U.S. Forest Service’s national contract for mobile radios recently switched from Bendix King (BK) mobile radios to Kenwood mobile radios (handheld radios are not included in this contract change).

During an Initial Attack fire in Montana in April, federal employees attempted to clone a Kenwood mobile radio installed in their fire vehicle. This new mobile radio did not have a programming guide, user guide, or a cloning cable that goes between BK and Kenwood radios. Further, fire personnel were not familiar with the platform of this recently installed Kenwood mobile radio. Fortunately, during this incident, handheld radio communication worked fine, and mobile radio use was not required.

Lessons:

-Kenwood mobile radios will need to be hand programmed by the operator, unless a radio tech from the local incident area is available.
-Whenever new hardware is issued that affects LCES, stop and prioritize the time to ensure that all people who may be using the new hardware know how to use it.
-Prompt all radio techs with a crash course or programming or user guide when issuing new equipment when literature is not widely available.

Get the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/montana-radio-cloning-issues-2026

Texas Dozer Transport Rollover – Texas – February 21, 2026

During a period of heightened wildfire danger in the Texas Panhandle in February of 2026, multiple Texas A&M Forest Service resources from other areas of the state were moved to preposition. After several days, the fire danger decreased, and many resources were sent back to their home units. One of these resources was a Caterpillar D5K2 dozer or tractor-plow, transported using a Freightliner M112. The first driver drove over half of the 560 mile journey, and then swapped with the second driver for the remainder of the trip. While exiting the interstate to use a rest area about two hours after this driver swap, the transport encountered a sudden sharpening of the exit ramp curve, causing it to leave the roadway and roll over several times. While it rolled, the binders holding the dozer to the back of the truck broke, and the dozer rolled onto its side. The transport ended up back onto its wheels not far from the dozer. Both occupants suffered minor injuries for which they were treated and released.

Lessons:
-Familiarize yourself with the route you will be taking, including turns, potential rest stops, bridges, etc. especially when driving large trucks.
-Both occupants’ cell phones detected the force of the accident and automatically notified 911 of the accident. Consider turning on this setting in your phone.
-What is you unit’s hospital liaison program? Who will assume this role, and who is their backup? How familiar are these people with this critical role?

Get the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/texas-dozer-transport-rollover-2026

On April 14, 2026, at 9:02 PM, a fire was reported in the Printer, KY area. The incident commander type 5 (IC) and the county fire crew were dispatched. IC found the fire's location but, because of the location, decided to return in daylight to construct containment lines. No structure was threatened by the fire.
The next day, the IC and crew returned to the scene and conducted an extended attack on an estimated 4-5 acres of burning timber. Around 3:30 PM on April 15, 2026, the dozer rollover occurred. The dozer was working off an old strip-mine
road, constructing a containment line. The dozer became high centered on a rock, which caused it to skid downhill. Once it was off the rock, the tracks on the dozer took hold, tipping it onto its side. The operator was able to exit the dozer with only minor injuries. Fuel began to leak from the dozer. The fire moved toward the dozer, and the dozer ended up engulfed in flames. The crew tried to put in a line around the dozer but was unsuccessful. The dozer is a total loss.
The dozer rollover occurred due to the unknown depth of the rock under the leaf/debris and soil during the construction of the containment lines.

Get the full report here: https://www.lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/gunstock-fire-heavy-equipment-incident-2026