Abdul.Quayyum.Khan.Kundi

Iran war & Imran Khan - Abdul Quayyum Kundi

When Iran prepared for a potential confrontation with the US and Israel, it did so with clear geopolitical and military objectives. Militarily, the aim was never outright victory in a conventional sense, but resilience — to absorb the bombing strikes without collapsing, and then respond in a way that imposed real costs on the adversary. They understood that asymmetric warfare was not just a choice, but their only viable strategy.

Geopolitically, Iran also sought to recalibrate the regional balance. The GCC states, despite their wealth, have limited independent military capacity and have maintained an adversarial and often dismissive posture toward Iran for over four decades. Tehran saw an opportunity to send a calculated message — to force a reassessment of their actual weight in regional power dynamics. By that measure, Iran appears to have achieved part of its objective.

Every crisis carries within it an opportunity. The current situation presents Pakistan with one such opening — though whether we have the clarity and capacity to seize it remains uncertain.

For Pakistan, this was not just Iran’s war; it was an existential concern. A prolonged conflict would have triggered soaring fuel prices, disrupted the flow of petrodollars that sustain the economy, reduced expatriate remittances, and risked capital withdrawals from GCC states that have long propped up foreign reserves. Faced with these realities, the hybrid regime predictably turned to diplomacy — not out of strategic vision, but out of desperate necessity.

While Pakistan’s diplomatic star shines brighter, there is little confidence that this diplomatic capital will translate into lasting national gain. History offers sobering lessons. In 1971, Pakistan facilitated the US–China opening but failed to convert that role into meaningful economic or military advantage. During President Trump’s first term, Pakistan helped enable the Doha Accord with the Afghan Taliban — yet the aftermath brought greater instability, with abandoned weapons now fueling militancy against Pakistan itself.

Today, Pakistan once again finds itself facilitating dialogue — this time between the US and Iran. But one must ask: if Iran eventually normalizes relations with the US and emerges as a strategic economic partner — as Vietnam and Japan once did after conflict — where does that leave Pakistan?

The uncomfortable truth is that Pakistan’s foreign policy has too often been reactive, personality-driven, impulsive, and strategically shallow. It serves those in power in the moment, rather than advancing long-term national interests.

For years, I have argued that no single Muslim-majority country possesses the strength to stand alone against external pressure and aggression. The logical path forward is collective security — a strategic bloc that creates deterrence through unity. Early in Imran Khan’s tenure, I proposed such a framework involving a small group of key states. To his credit, he immediately grasped the idea and moved to operationalize it, engaging leaders like Erdoğan and Mahathir and laying the groundwork for deeper coordination.

However, the initiative faltered. The exclusion of Saudi Arabia triggered resistance from a petrodollar-dependent establishment, which ultimately undermined the effort — even preventing Pakistan’s participation in the Kuala Lumpur summit. That moment marked a critical inflection point and foreshadowed deeper fractures to come. Imran Khan was forced out of office using palace intrigue.

Leaders like Imran Khan — much like Bhutto before him — recognized the strategic necessity of collective security in the Muslim world. With institutional backing, such a vision might have evolved into a meaningful deterrent framework — one that could have altered the trajectory of recent crises, from Gaza genocide to the broader regional instability resulting from Iran war. Not a single Muslim country came to Iran’s aid to stop unrestrained bombing of its citizens and infrastructure.

We cannot rewrite the past, but we can still shape the future. The ongoing crisis in the Middle East is not just a threat — it is an opportunity. Pakistan must move beyond short-term calculations and develop a coherent, long-term foreign policy doctrine — one that places economic strength, regional connectivity, and sustainable development at its core. Only then can it turn moments of crisis into milestones of national progress. I can share some ideas if the regime reaches out for it. If not, I wish them good luck.

New World Order - Abdul Quayyum Khan Kundi

When President Obama rolled out his “Pivot to Asia” in 2011, two big questions immediately hung in the air.

First: What happens to Europe’s security?
Since 1945, the United States has carried Europe’s security on its back through NATO. America has been the largest contributor in troops, weapons, and money. Under that security umbrella, Europe focused on rebuilding and growing its economy. The arrangement worked — but it also made Europe comfortable and dependent.

Second: What about Israel?
For decades, U.S. policy in the Middle East has revolved around protecting Israel’s qualitative military edge while maintaining influence over Arab states — particularly those rich in oil. Israel has functioned not just as an ally, but as a strategic anchor in a volatile region where control of energy resources and inducement to buy expensive American arms mattered.

Before shifting focus to Asia, Washington had to stabilize these two theaters.

Europe: Wake-Up Call

The U.S. began pressuring European countries, starting in Obama administration, to spend more on their own defense and take greater responsibility inside NATO. Progress was slow. Many European governments were reluctant to dramatically increase military budgets without a clear, immediate threat.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine woke up Europe from deep slumber. Americans decided to exploit it to the fullest.
For nearly two decades, Russia had objected to NATO expansion toward its borders. Diplomatic efforts came and went, but tensions kept rising as more former Soviet states moved closer to NATO. Eventually, Moscow chose a military path — a decision that reshaped European security overnight.
The war forced Europe to rearm, increase defense spending, and re-prioritize security. From Washington’s perspective, Europe was finally moving.
At the same time, the U.S. has little interest in seeing Europe become so strategically independent that it rivals American influence. A stronger Europe is useful. A competing Europe is not. Russian threat has to stay alive for America to pivot to Asia. Inclusion of Finland and Sweden in NATO was a historic shift with that objective in mind.

Israel and the Middle East

The second issue was eliminating or weakening states and actors perceived as threats to Israel.
One of the serious threats to Israel was Hamas. The October 7 Hamas attack on Israel triggered a devastating war in Gaza. It provided her an opportunity to eliminate Palestinians from Gaza Strip and annex it to become part of Israel. The scale of destruction and genocide has drawn global outrage and renewed debate about long-term strategy in the region. A core unanswered question remains: what was Hamas’ endgame, and how were civilians meant to be protected in the inevitable Israeli response? In the absence of a clear answer there will always be conspiracy theories about their intentions because in the end it served the purpose of Israel.
Over the past two decades, several regional powers that challenged hegemony of Israel — Iraq, Libya, Syria — have been systematically destabilized or significantly weakened. Iran remains the last major adversary in this axis, and tensions there continue. American/Israeli attack on Iran is last ditch effort to achieve that objective.
Parallel to this, the U.S. pushed normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab states — the Abraham Accords — aiming to integrate Israel more fully into the regional security architecture. The Gaza war slowed that momentum, but the broader strategic goal has not disappeared.
With Europe militarizing and the Middle East recalibrated, the Pivot to Asia can move to center stage.��The Real Target: China

Let’s be honest — the pivot is about one country: China.
Containing China appears to involve several layers.
1. A NATO-like security structure in Asia.
The idea is to build a coalition of regional powers — Japan, South Korea, Australia, Indonesia, perhaps others — to counterbalance China’s military growth. India was courted heavily, but New Delhi has shown it prefers strategic autonomy rather than formal alignment. India has decided to be a factory floor rather than a strategic ally.
2. Resource control.
While the U.S. was entangled in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, China was securing long-term access to oil, rare earth minerals, infrastructure, and technology supply chains across Africa, Latin America, and Asia.
Now Washington is working to counter that — reshoring supply chains, limiting advanced chip exports, building alternative mineral partnerships, and tightening sanctions where needed.
Oil markets remain a strategic lever. Control of Venezuelan and Middle Eastern oil provides a viable geo strategic card. Critical minerals — lithium, cobalt, rare earths — are the next battlefield.
3. Strategic pressure.
Expect rising tensions around Taiwan, the South China Sea, and regional flashpoints. The goal isn’t necessarily war — it’s containment through pressure.
The United Kingdom, with its long history of balancing powers, often plays a supporting role in this broader strategy.

Will It Work?

I’m skeptical.
First, America’s long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan didn’t come cheap — they drove up the national debt by trillions. Right now the U.S. owes about $38 trillion, and estimates project that could soar toward $58 trillion over the next decade.
Second, long wars with ambiguous outcomes have weakened the aura of military invincibility. Smaller actors have shown they can offset advanced weapons with asymmetric tactics.
Third, America’s strength has always come from attracting global talent. Restrictive immigration rhetoric risks undermining that advantage.
Fourth, institutions matter. Rule of law, constitutional norms, political stability — these were America’s greatest strategic assets. Political polarization has strained them.
Fifth, America has started pulling apart the very global order it once built and led. In doing so, it has damaged its own credibility and strained the alliances that were once its greatest strength.�
Does That Mean China Wins?

Not necessarily.
China has enormous strengths: economic scale, industrial capacity, technological advancement. But global dominance requires more than GDP.
Historically, China has focused inward, prioritizing domestic stability over global ideological leadership. It lacks experience building and sustaining a global order.
Demographics are a serious challenge. An aging population and shrinking workforce will weigh heavily on long-term growth.
Militarily, China has modernized rapidly — but it lacks large-scale combat experience. Advanced systems are impressive, but untested in major conflict.
And politically, leadership succession has often been a fragile moment in Chinese history. By extending his tenure beyond the traditional two-term norm, Xi Jinping has centralized power — but also concentrated risk.

A Changing World Order

As the old powers — the United States, Russia, and China — wrestle with internal strains, something bigger may be happening.
Africa’s population is booming. Southeast Asia is rising. Latin America holds vast resources. The next chapter of global power may not belong to a single hegemon at all.
The real story of the 21st century may not be who dominates — but how power diffuses.
The Pivot to Asia isn’t just a policy shift. It’s part of a much larger transformation. And the outcome is far from decided.

Pivot to Asia.